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IDENTIFYING EQUITABLE DAMAGES 
1. Creation of the Remedy 
The Inherent Power 
Before 1958 Courts of Chancery in England had a very limited inherent 
power to award damages. The remedy at common law was overlooked in 
favour of the administration of the equitable principles and remedies 
which had developed to meet the inadequacies of the common law, and 
particularly of damages as a remedy. However there were occasions in 
Chancery when the Court did not think it appropriate to order an 
injunction or specific performance or any other equitable remedy but 
where damages could properly have been awarded. The original 
inherent jurisdiction was confined to the award of damages arising 
out of the deterioration of property as a result of a vendor's delay 
in settling, or as a result of the defendant's wrongful acts 
following the issue of proceedings, as a result of which, specific 
performance became impossible. Phelps v Protheroe (1855) 7 De GM and 
G 722. 
Because of this inability on the part of the Courts of Equity to 
award damages: 
"Great complaints were constantly made by the public that when 
plaintiffs came into a Court of Equity for specific performance, 
the Court of Equity sent them to a Court of Law in order to 
recover damages, so that the parties were bandied about, as it 
was said, from one Court to the other." Ferguson v Wilson 
(1866) LR Ch 77 at p.88 per Turner L.J. 
A bill was therefore promoted following the third report of Her 
Majesty's Commissioners appointed to enquire into the process 
practice and system of pleading in the Court of Chancery, (1856) (to 
which Sir Hugh Cairns, a Chancery Judge, later Lord Chancellor, 
contributed) whose main purpose was to do away with the necessity 
for separate proceedings where a plaintiff could claim both 
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inequitable remedy, and common law damages. Jolowicz Damages in 
Equity - a Study of Lord Cairns' Act (1975) CLJ at 224 and 225. 
Lord Cairns Act 
The Chancery Amendment Act 1958 (21 and 22 Viet. c 27), known as Lord 
Cairns' Act provided (S. 2): 
11 In all cases in which the Court of Chancery has jurisdiction to 
entertain an application for an injunction against a breach of 
any covenant, contract, or agreement, or against the Commission 
or continuance of any wrongful act, or for the specific 
performance of any covenant, contract or agreement, it shall be 
lawful for the same Court, if it shall think fit, to award 
damages to the party injured, either in addition to or in 
substitution for such injunction or specific performance, and 
such damages may be assessed in such manner as the Court shall 
direct. 11 
As Jolowicz has said ((1975) CLJ supra at p 227) 11 This enactment did 
a good deal more than simply enable the Court of Chancery to award 
the kind of damages that could have been awarded at common law. 
There was created, quite possibly unintentionally, a power to award 
damages I in substitution for .• injunction or specific 
performance, 1 11 • 
Repeal of Lord Cairns' Act and the Fused Jurisdiction in England and 
New Zealand 
To determine the status of Lord Cairns' Act in New Zealand involves a 
further excursion into the legislative attentions to which Lord 
Cairns' Act was later subject in England. The Judicature Act 1873 
gave Courts of Equity powers hitherto possessed only by the Courts of 
Common Law to award damages. Presumably on the footing that this 
fusion made Lord Cairn's Act unnecessary, the Statutes Law Revision 
and Civil Procedure Act 1883 46 and 47 Viet c 49, designed to remove 
obsolete Acts, repealed Lord Cairns' Act (but not in Ireland) but by 
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a savings clause provided that the repeal would not affect any 
jurisdiction or principle or rule of law or of equity established or 
confirmed by any enactment so repealed. These savings provisions 
were themselves repealed by the Statutes Law Revision Act of 1898 
which however 11 saves 11 any principle or rule of law or established 
jurisdiction notwithstanding that it was affirmed by or derived from 
repealed enactments. Lord Cairns' Act survived in England only as an 
Irish Statute in the reprints, but its principles are firmly embedded 
in a caselaw both of New Zealand and of England. 
However, the view that, despite the savings provisions of the 1883 
and 1893 enactments, Lord Cairns' Act was a dead letter as a result 
of fusion found expression in Dreyfus v Peruvian Guano Co 43 Ch D 
316, and in Ryder v Hall and Anor (1905) 2 NZLR 385. In the former 
case Bowen LJ held that there could be no damages for a threatened 
wrong (the delivery of 11 cargoes of guano to the wrong party), but 
only damages of the common law stripe which the Courts of Chancery 
were now entitled to award. In the New Zealand case, Stout CJ 
expressed the view that as Ss 5 and 16 of the Supreme Court Acts of 
1860 and 1882 gave to that Court all the equitable and common law 
jurisdiction of all the English Courts and 11 all such judicial 
jurisdiction as may be necessary to administer the laws of New 
Zealand" - "there is in my opinion no necessity to invoke Lord 
Cairns' Act 11 • In this case, which involved minor flooding, damage 
had already occurred, and common law damages were awarded at 40 
shillings in lieu of the injunction which had been sought, so that 
further actions by the plaintiff were effectively debarred. Once 
again, a Court took the view, (wrongly, it is submitted) that Lord 
Cairns' Act did nothing but give a power to award common law damages 
instead of equitable remedies, and that as a result of the fusion of 
law and equity, was redundant. 
The Resurrection of Lord Cairns' Act 
That Lord Cairns' Act survived in spirit to confer a completely new 
jurisdiction was put beyond doubt by the decision in Leeds Industrial 
Cooperative Society Ltd v Slack (1924) A.C. 851, in the House of 
Lords. The defendant's building when completed would obstruct the 
ancient rights of the plaintiff, who sought an injunction. In other 
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words the injury had been threatened but had not actually occurred so 
that while an injunction might have been granted, common law damages 
whether as an alternative or otherwise, would not have been available 
because no loss had occurred. The Court did not want to order an 
injunction because the prospective loss would be slight. Viscount 
Finlay held however that although the Act itself was repealed, by 
virtue of the combined effect of the Judicature Act and the repealing 
Statutes, the law and practice which Lord Cairns' Act laid down 
remained unaltered. Thus, Lord Cairns' Act does give rise to the 
power to award damages in cases where no such power previously 
existed either at common law or in equity, and must be relied upon in 
such cases. 
As recently as 1974, it was submitted in a New Zealand Court that 
Lord Cairns' Act was merely than a procedural Act which did no more 
in its time than avoid the necessity for a litigant to go to two 
different Courts for complete relief. Souster v Epsom Plumbing 
Contractors Ltd (1974) 2 NZLR 515. McMullin J. adopted the 
fundamental construction in Leeds Industrial Coop Society v Slack in 
holding that Lord Cairns had created a new remedy based upon what was 
lost as a result of the Court's refusal to grant either an injunction 
or specific performance. 
2. Jurisdiction 
The whole object of Lord Cairns' Act was to enable the Court to award 
damages where it did not grant an application for injunction or 
specific performance. It follows therefore that the Court must have 
been in a position to contemplate granting an injunction or specific 
performance before it could award damages in lieu. The Court must, 
before it makes an award, have jurisdiction to entertain an 
application for one or other of these remedies. It must be the kind 
of case where it could have granted the remedy although obviously, 
not necessarily where it would have done so. It is necessary 
therefore to distinguish between factors which would prohibit the 
Court from considering the grant of the equitable remedies, which go 
to the jurisdiction, and factors which are among those the Court will 
take into account in exercising its discretion, which do not go to 
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the jurisdiction. Guidance may be obtained from Spry - Equitable 
Remedies at page 546. Examples of matters going to the jurisdiction 
are: 
1. whether the case is within the territorial jurisdiction of the 
Court (i.e. whether the defendant is within the forum, has been 
served without it pursuant to the rules, or has submitted to the 
jurisdiction); 
2. whether the Court has power in respect of the defendant (for 
example the Court may not be able to award specific performance 
against an an infant); 
3. whether there is an adequate remedy at law - if there is, the 
Court cannot consider the equitable remedies and in consequence 
cannot consider the grant of equitable damages in lieu; 
4. whether performance is impossible or illegal. In Lavery v 
Pursell (1888) 39 Ch D 508 specific performance could not be 
considered because the property in question had been sold at the 
time of issue of proceedings. On the other hand, in Grocott v 
Ayson (1975) 2 NZLR 586, while there would have been difficulty 
in gaining access to the land of a third party for certain 
works, Cooke J. reaffirmed the principle that an injunction 
would not be imposed where the thing to be done is impossible, 
unenforceable or unlawful, but that mere futility on the part of 
the things ought to be done, or the existence of difficulties 
that had to be overcome before the injunction could take effect, 
did not amount to an absolute bar. 
On the other hand, matters of discretion which might lead to an 
injunction or specific performance being refused, but which would 
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not prevent the assessment of damages under Lord Cairns' Act 
include: 
Difficulty of enforcement 





Triviality of injury 
Unfairness (in obtaining the right sought to be enforced) 
Prior inconsistent contract (where specific performance was sought in 
relation to a later contract). 
The presence of any of these might lead to an injunction or specific 
performance being refused. However, the Court has a discretion 
whether or not to grant equitable damages instead, or to refuse 
relief altogether. It will become apparent later however that 
equitable damages might therefore be regarded both as a licence, 
compulsorily issued, permitting a plaintiff to carry on an otherwise 
wrongful activity in exchange for damages, and as a means of 
compensating a plaintiff where there were defects in his case which 
prevented the grant of an injunction or specific performance. 
There are three final points to be made about the Court's 
jurisdiction to award damages. First, where a contract is partly 
enforceable by injunction or specific performance and partly not, 
specific relief might be given in respect of the first part, and 
damages in respect of the part which is not enforceable in this way. 
Soames v Edge (1860) Johns 669. Second, the Court will have 
jurisdiction to award equitable damages even though they have not 
been asked for in the pleadings Dell v Beasley (1959) NZLR 89 at 
p.93. All that needs to be shown is that an injunction or specifi c 
performance could have been ordered. The third question to be 
answered concerning jurisdiction is - when must jurisdiction exist, 
when proceedings are issued, at the time of hearing, or at some other 
time? It is reasonably clear that as long as the Court has 
jurisdiction to grant specific performance or an injunction when the 
3. 
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proceedings were commenced, that is sufficient to form a foundation 
for the grant of damages, even if performance later becomes 
impossible or if the defendant later performs the contract. 
Equitable damages may still be awarded. Cory v Thomas Ironworks and 
Shipbuilding Company (1863) 11 WR 589. It appears also that as long 
as the Court has power at the time the proceedings are heard to make 
specific orders, then it should be able to award damages instead 
(Spry at p.551). 
Equitable Damages - A New Right to Damages 
Equitable damages will only be of interest and use in a 11 fused 11 
jurisdiction if they offer something more than common law damages, 
since there is no longer a necessity for Court hopping. This part of 
the paper is therefore intended to identify cases where no damages 
would be available at common law but might be under Lord Cairns' Act. 
Firstly, the right to be enforced may be purely equitable, without a 
corresponding right to legal damages, and second, even where there is 
a right to legal damages, Lord Cairns' Act may enable the Court to 
award damages for losses beyond those which could be compensated at 
common law. 
For example: 
1. Confidentiality. There is now a well-established equitable 
right to have certain information treated as confidential. This 
is a purely equitable cause of action, not necessarily based on 
breach of contract or tort, but warranting the grant of an 
injunction. In A.B. Consolidated Ltd v Europe Strength Food Co 
(1978) 2 NZLR 515 CA the Court considered the question whether 
damages would have been an adequate remedy, concluded in the 
particular circumstances (in which the appellant had obtained 
secret information about extruding biscuits during negotiations) 
that they would not have been, and ordered an injunction. In 
Seager v Copytex Ltd (No 2) (1969) 1 WLR 809, Denning LJ assumed 
a power to award damages in a case involving breach of 
confidentiality, without making specific reference to Lord 
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Cairns' Act, or to the inherent power. It seems clear however 
that in an appropriate case damages could be awarded to a victim 
of a breach in lieu of an injunction. 
2. Part Performance 
A claim based on a contract unenforceable by virtue of the 
Contracts Enforcement Act 1952 which is saved by the equitable 
doctrine of part performance entitling the parties to specific 
performance of it may of course attract an award of damages 
based on Lord Cairns' Act, even although such an award could not 
be made at common law. Price v Strange (1978) Ch 337 at 358. 
3. Future Loss 
(a) Specific performance. Specific performance can be ordered 
where a breach of contract is anticipated, does not amount 
to a repudiation, and has not yet taken place. Indeed, 
the cause of action is not the breach or anticipated 
breach of the contract, but the duty of the other party in 
equity to perform. A writ can therefore be issued before 
the time for performance has arrived. Marks v Lilley 
(1959) 1 WLR 749. It follows that damages could be 
awarded under Lord Cairns' Act for a threatened breach, in 
lieu of specific performance, or in addition to it. Such 
damages would not, clearly, otherwise, be available. 
The claim in Marks v Lilley was proceeded with 
notwithstanding settlement of the transaction concerned, 
to recover costs. 
(b) Injunction "quia timet". It is the essence of this 
injunction that it is awarded only where damage is 
apprehended but has not yet occurred. Damages may be 
awarded under Lord Cairns' Act instead of an injunction, 
even though no wrong may actually have been done and even 
though no damage has yet accrued. (The prerequisites to 
an award at common law). Thus in Hooper v Rodgers (1975) 
1 Ch. 43, a case involving the withdrawal of support from 
the plaintiff's land, damages were awarded. Russell LJ 
said: 
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11 It is, I apprehend, clear that in respect of the support 
of the farmhouse no damages at common law could have been 
awarded. It is established by authority binding upon this 
Court (a) that damage is, the gist of the action in 
nuisance, (b) that in an action for damages based upon 
deprivation of support to land or buildings it is 
necessary to establish that the land or buildings have 
been physically damaged by the withdrawal of support and 
(c) that damages cannot be awarded at common law in a case 
of probable or even certain physical damage to the land or 
buildings from loss of support based upon a present 
decline in the market value of the land due to such 
probable or certain future physical damage. But this is a 
case in which a mandatory order was sought upon the 
defendant to take such steps as were necessary to 
reinstate the excavated track to its former condition so 
as to restore to the slope the angle of repose of the soil 
and thus avert the threat of future removal of support to 
the farmhouse. The award of damages could only be 
supported as equitable damages under the Chancery 
Amendment Act 1858 (Lord Cairns' Act) in lieu of such an 
injunction. The injunction, mandatory in character, would 
be quia timet, as preventing an apprehended legal wrong, 
the legal wrong requiring in this case physical damage to 
the farmhouse for its constitution or (save the mark) 
perfection. 11 
And in Leeds Industrial Cooperative v Slack (supra) the Court 
awarded damages for the threatened obstruction of ancient 
lights, which could not have been compensated for by damages at 
common law. 
Breach of restrictive covenant. 
Where a plaintiff is not a party to a restrictive covenant 
applying to land, and the covenant is not protected by 
registration or some similar means, he has an equitable right 
only to enforce the covenant and, in consequence, is entitled to 
4. 
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damages only by virtue of Lord Cairns' Act. Wrotham Park Estate 
v Parkside Homes (1974) 2 All ER 321. 
Fiduciary Relationships 
As these are matters within the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
Courts of equity, the award of damages in cases concerned 
exclusively with regulating such relationships is not 
necessarily contemplated by Lord Cairns' Act. However the 
Courts may in appropriate cases be more inclined to exercise 
their inherent jurisdiction. 
Equitable Damages in Administrative Law 
Until this point is reached, wherever the Courts have had power to 
consider granting an injunction or specific performance, they have 
also accepted without question a power to award damages under Lord 
Cairns' Act. This is to be expected in view of the wording of 
Section 2 - "in all cases in which the Court of Chancery has 
jurisdiction to entertain an application for an injunction •.• or for. 
specific performance •.• it shall be lawful for the same Court, if it 
shall think fit, to award damages ... ". 
It would be logical then to assume that if an injunction could be 
applied for in the administrative law field, then Lord Cairns' Act 
would permit the award of damages in addition to or in substitution 
for such an injunction. As far as this writer can ascertain, the 
issue has never squarely come before the Courts in England. It has, 
however, been considered in at least two New Zealand cases, and on 
both occasions, the Courts have shied away from contemplating an 
award of damages under Lord Cairns' Act, notwithstanding that an 
injunction might have been awarded. 
It is outside the scope of this paper to consider all the 
circumstances in which injunctions might be awarded whether in the 
public or in the private law fields. What is clear however, is that 
an injunction" may be awarded in all cases where the award of the 
remedy appears to the Court to be just or convenient and where 
redress might be properly claimed either at law or in equity. More 
particularly Rule 462 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides for the 
grant of an injunction to restrain any officer from the breach of any 
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duty •.• which he has threatened or has already commenced to commit". 
And by virtue of Section 4 (1) of the Judicature Amendment Act 1972, 
the Court has power on an application to review to grant in respect 
of the exercise of a statutory power any relief the applicant might 
have been entitled to in proceedings inter alia, an injunction. 
Before considering the New Zealand judgments and their approach to 
equitable damages in this field, a bare outline of the common law 
approach to compensation in the administrative field may be 
appropriate. 
In Abbott v Sullivan (1952) 1 KB 189 a committee of a trade union (a 
domestic tribunal) had purported to expel one of its members. It was 
a closed shop so he lost his employment for a time. He was 
subsequently reinstated but claimed damages alleging that the 
committee had no jurisdiction to expel him. The majority of the 
Court (Evershed MR, Denning and Morris LJJ) held that the domestic 
tribunal in this case lacked jurisdiction but acted conscientiously 
and honestly but mistakenly, and that there was no basis or authority 
for extending the law of tort to cover that situation (cf where the 
exercise of power without jurisdiction is malicious). In Gould v 
Wellington Waterside Workers Industrial Union of Workers (1934) NZLR 
1025 a similar action succeeded because the Union's rules amounted to 
a contract, and a tortious element was found to exist. In Abbott 
the plaintiff had been reinstated before he commenced his action, so 
no injunction was sought, but it was clear that notwithstanding the 
absence of a right to sue in tort, the Court could have granted an 
injunction to prevent a person being excluded from a group by means 
contrary to natural justice. 
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Elsewhere in de Smith (pp 337 - 338) under the heading "Liability in 
Tort for Exercise of Powers in Bad Faith" the learned authors outline 
the possible characteristics of such a tort. They note a general 
principle that the performance of a public duty in good faith is 
protected against civil liability (Everett v Griffiths (1921) 1 AC 
631), but that this proposition is clearly inapplicable to many 
statutory functions involving the exercise of discretion, 
notwithstanding good faith, where there has been some negligent act 
causing damage. The common thread noted in cases where good faith is 
a sufficient protection is the exercise of broadly judicial function 
where only wilful or malicious partiality or discrimination will 
bring a right of action. The authors conclude: 
"It would seem however, that there is a tort as yet imperfectly 
defined, consisting of the infliction of damage by the 
deliberate abuse of public office or authority - eg: by 
refusing, cancelling or procuring the cancellation of a licence 
or procuring the making of a compulsory purchase order for 
improper motives. This tort is not firmly anchored in English 
case law; in particular, it is not certain what kind of damage 
has to be sustained and by whom before civil liability can 
arise", p.339, and further 
"The rules relating to the circumstances in which a person 
injured by a breach of statutory duty can recover damages form a 
notoriously difficult area of the law of Tort. It is accepted 
that the question whether an action under the Statute (as 
distinct from an action for a common law wrong) will lie is 
dependent on the intention of the legislature and that its 
intention must be ascertained 'by a consideration of the whole 
Act and the circumstances, including the pre-existing law, in 
which it was enacted'. But when Parliament has abstained from 
expressing its intention it is not unlikely that neither the 
draughtsman nor the sponsors of the Bill nor the majority of 
members of either House have addressed their minds to the 
matter. The answer to the question whether an action will lie 
for breach of a statutory duty is necessarily influenced by the 
views held by individual Judges as by the requirements of public 
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policy. General principles of construction which circumscribe 
judicial discretion have been evolved; but the broader the 
statement of principle the more carefully must it be qualified 
by exception". 
Although de Smith notes at p.23 that civil actions for private law 
remedies against public authorities and officials are generally 
indistinguishable from ordinary civil proceedings and (as Dicey 
rightly observed) there is no separate law of administrative 
liability, the Courts have hesitated to develope the law in this 
field with the gusto shown in some other areas. The temptation has 
been to enter, and not to emerge from, "the labyrinthine byways of 
the common law" (de Smith p 429). To use a phrase from de Smith 
again, might not the "sense of greater freedom in the field of 
equity" inspire a more useful development. 
One difficulty which the development of an independent Tort has run 
into is the distinction between void and voidable administrative 
actions. de Smith at p.151: 
"Behind the simple dichotomy of void and voidable (invalid and 
temporarily invalid) acts lurks terminological or conceptual 
problems of excruciating complexity. To explore them fully 
would not be justifiable in a work of these dimensions. We 
should soon be engulfed in a morass of inconsistent and often 
unconsidered judicial dicta." 
An explanation for this development is given by Lord Wilberforce in 
Hoffman - La Roche v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry (1974) 
2 All ER 1128 at 1146. In the case, the Secretary of State applied 
for an injunction preventing the sale of librium and valium at higher 
prices following allegations that the Secretary's fixing of lower 
prices had been in breach of natural justice, ultra vires etc. An 
injunction was granted without an undertaking as to damages. In his 
dissenting Judgment Lord Wilberforce said: 
"It is said that no undertaking should be insisted on, unless 
the effect of the La Roche's group's eventual success were to 
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make the order void ab initio - the argument being that 
otherwise no injustice would result .•. " 
Lord Wilberforce proceeds: 
"This phrase void ab initio has engendered may learned 
distinctions and much confused thinking - unnecessarily in my 
opinion. There can be no doubt in the first place that an ultra 
vires act is simply void; see in confirmation Ridge v Baldwin 
(1963) 2 All ER 66. In truth when the Court says an act of 
administration is voidable or void, but not ab initio this is 
simply a reflection of a conclusion, already reached on 
unexpressed grounds, that the Court is not willing in casu to 
give compensation or other redress to the person who establishes 
the nullity. Underlying the use of the phrase in the present 
case and I suspect underlying most of the reasoning in the Court 
of Appeal is an unwillingness to accept that a subject should be 
indemnified for loss sustained by invalid administrative 
actions. It is this which requires examination rather than some 
supposed visible quality of the order itself. 
In more developed legal systems this particular difficulty does 
not arise. Such systems given indemnity to persons injured by 
illegal acts of the administration. Consequently, when the 
prospective loss which may be caused by an order is pecuniary, 
there is no need to suspend the impugned administrative act. It 
can take effect (in our language an injunction can be given) and 
at the end of the day the subject can if necessary be 
compensated. On the other hand, if a prospective loss is not 
pecuniary (in our language 11 irreparablei') the act may be 
suspended pending decision - in our language, interim enforcement 
may be refused. 
There is clearly an important principle here which has not been 
elucidated by English law, or even brought into the open" 
In other words if the administrative act is merely voidable (ie void 
only when it is declared to be so by the Court) then there is 
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supposed to be no wrongful act from which a right to damages can 
flow. 
That the distinction (between void and voidable) can be a means 
(albeit a clumsy one) of enabling the Court to exercise a discretion 
over the remedies sought is to some extent confirmed in de Smith at 
p.241 fn 43. It is also a means of ensuring that a decision remains 
valid until successfully impugned by someone with locus standi - see 
Durayappah v Fernando (1967) 2 AC 337 PC. 
It seems clear that in this field an injunction may be awarded in 
many circumstances where the Courts would not have been prepared to 
award damages. The jurisdiction is as ample against public 
authorities as it is to award injunctions against private defendants, 
an injunction may be awarded in circumstances which would not apply 
to a private individual - eg where the authority has exceeded or has 
threatened to exceed its statutory powers. de Smith p.443. There is 
no limitation in granting an injunction to cases where the authority 
is actuated by wilfulness or malice, in other words an injunction 
will be granted even although the acts complained of do not amount to 
tortious conduct. 
Why then should the Court not exercise its power to award damages 
against a public body or official in lieu of an injunction, under 
Lord Cairns' Act? There can, it is submitted, be little doubt that 
conduct by such an authority which is ultra vires, in breach of a 
statutory duty, or in breach of the rules of natural justice, will 
amount to a "wrongful act" in terms of S.2 of Lord Cairns' Act. 
Re Princess Victoria (1954) NI 178 Lord MacDermott LCJ p.178, Dacre v 
Dacre (1798) 1 B & P 250 both cited in "Words and Phrases Legally 
Defined" 2nd Ed.Vol 5, and Emery v Emery (1946) NZLR 545 Myers CJ at 
p.552. 
de Smith at p.245 states that breach of the audi alteram partem rule 
does not give rise to an action for damages unless among other things 
it amounts to a deliberate misuse of public functions leading to 
economic loss. In this particular case, it is unnecessary in de 
Smith's view to show that the act was void, merely illegal. In a 
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footnote (No.94) reference is made to Mahrah v Attorney General for 
Trinidad and Tobago No. 2 (1972) 2 WLR 902 PC which involved a 
constitutional provision for redress for breach of fundamental rights 
which was held to include the right to an award of damages where a 
person was committed for contempt in breach of the requirements of 
natural justice. The footnote raises the query whether damages might 
be awarded under Lord Cairns' Act in lieu of an injunction. And in 
Takara Properties Ltd v Rowling (1976 2 NZLR 651 at 672 Beattie J. 
distinguished the Hoffman La Roche case on the ground that "it did 
not relate to a cause of action in tort but rather to damage which 
might have been assessed pursuant to an undertaking filed in Court 
for the purpose of compensating for losses proved to have been 
suffered following an injunction." While that may be a matter of 
contract or Court order, the passage might contemplate a route for 
compensation other than the common law. 
The distinction between the ability or jurisdiction of the Court to 
grant an injunction in the public law field on the one hand, and the 
unavailability in the same case of any remedy in damages on the other 
is clearly demonstrated by the judgment in Attorney General & Anor 
(Pulford) v Birkenhead Borough and Anor (the builder) (1968) NZLR 383 
of Richmond J. 
Mrs Pulford lost her right of objection under town planning 
legislation to the construction of ugly flats next door to her 
property because the Council had wrongly treated the case as one for 
dispensation rather than as one requiring a properly notified 
application. She sought an injunction against the builders for the 
removal of the offending structures and damages against the Council 
for its failure to comply with its duties under the Town and Country 
Planning Act. Finally she sought damages in lieu of the injunction 
asked for against the builders. The learned Judge did not need to 
consider whether there was a claim against the Council for breach of 
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statutory duty. Mrs Pulford's claim for damages against the builder 
was based upon: 
1. the failure of the builders to comply with the planning 
legislation was a tort namely breach of statutory duty, and 
2. if the duty was a public duty only and not one owed to Mrs 
Pulford, because she suffered damage over and above the public 
generally, she was entitled to damages in lieu of an 
injunction. 
In relation to a liability in damages for breach of statutory duty 
the Judge referred to Maceachern v Pukekohe Borough (1965) NZLR 330 
and to the English view of town planning legislation, which was that 
such legislation limits the land owner in his free development of the 
land but cannot give rise to any separate action for breach of 
statutory duty unless what is done constitutes a nuisance, trespass, 
or other recognised tort. There was, the Judge concluded, no action 
in tort. 
However, the learned Judge referred to two propositions made in Boyce 
v Paddington Borough Council (1903) 1 Ch 109 which decided that there 
were two possible bases for any claim for an injunction in relation 
to interference with a public right: 
First, where the interference with the public right is such that 
some private right is at the same time interfered with (eg 
obstruction of a private right of access) or 
Second, although no private right is interfered with, special 
damage peculiar to the plaintiff is suffered from the 
interference with the public right. 
The Judge had already found that a failure to comply with the 
procedures under the planning legislation did not confer a private 
right, but that the plaintiff had suffered special damage beyond that 
suffered by the public at large and might therefore sue for an 
injunction, and held at p.390 line 50: 
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"It means that the equitable remedy of injunction is available 
at the suit of private individuals in cases where there is no 
common law action for damages for breach of statutory duty, or 
for the interference with any private right •.• by analogy from 
the law of public nuisance." 
The Judge went on to note that "the common law has developed in a 
restricted way as regards acknowledging the existence of any private 
right of action for breach of a statutory duty", which would limit 
the access of citizens to damages, in the way which has already been 
described. 
The Judge then confronted directly and apparently for the first time 
the proposition that despite the unavailability of damages at common 
law, he should award damages in lieu of the injunction (which for 
discretionary reasons it had been conceded should not be granted) on 
the strength of Lord Cairns' Act. 
He put the question in this way - "should Lord Cairns' Act be 
construed as extending to cases where the "wrongful act" is the 
breach of a public general duty?" He declined to so construe the act 
for these reasons: 
1. Lord Cairns' Act assumed an injured party whereas the 
jurisdiction with which the Judge was concerned did not depend 
on damage being suffered by anybody, and in the case of a 
private individual (not the Attorney-General) it was necessary 
to prove special damage only to achieve locus standi, and not, 
having acquired standing, to obtain the injunction. By using 
the words "to the party injured" Lord Cairns' Act only 
contemplates a jurisdiction where there will always be a party 
injured. 
It is submitted that while Lord Cairns' Act contemplates cases in 
which there will be an injured party (otherwise the question of 
damages does not arise) there is no reason to assume that the kinds 
of activity which S.2 contemplates will always involve injury. The 
Act simply enables the Court to award damages where that is the case. 
It is submitted that any other interpretation is not consistent with 
equitable principles. 
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2. To allow damages pursuant to Lord Cairn's Act would be 
inconsistent with the common law action for damages for breach 
of statutory duty which lays down different criteria, and that 
the application of Lord Cairns' Act would enable these to be 
circumvented by the back door. 
The absence of a remedy at common law is a prerequisite to 
and there may well be a good reason for giving the Act effect. 
As has been shown, there are cases where an injunction may be 
obtained in circumstances where there are no corresponding 
rights at law and where Lord Cairns' Act will nevertheless have 
application. In every such case the application of the Act may 
provide a remedy not in accordance with some common law 
principle. 
3. The final reason given for not applying Lord Cairns' Act was 
that the purpose of the injunction was to enforce a public duty, 
and to substitute for that damages to a private individual was 
incongruous. 
It is submitted that the incongruity may not exist where the breach 
of the public duty affects to any substantial degree only the 
plaintiff. The appropriateness or otherwise of damages in this 
situation would vary from case to case, and would be a matter for the 
exercise of the Court's discretion rather than a matter going to the 
jurisdiction. The purpose of an injunction is generally to enforce a 
duty, and it has been noted already that there is nothing inherently 
unique about actions in the public law field. 
The other New Zealand case in which the application of Lord Cairns' 
Act to an administrative law situation was considered is Stininato v 
Auckland Boxing Association & Others (1978) 1 NZLR 1 (CA). In that 
case a boxer sought declarations and damages in respect of the 
refusal of his application, and successive applications, for a 
licence as a professional boxer. The Court refused to allow damages 
under Lord Cairns' Act, first because no injunction had been claimed 
by the appellant at any stage. 
The second ground for declining to act was expressed by Cooke J. as 
follows: 
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"If, the action of members of a domestic tribunal were held to 
be sufficiently 11 wrongful 11 to justify an award of damages, there 
is no reason why this evolution should not be brought about 
directly by development of the law of tort. It would be neither 
necessary nor desirable to fall back on the old statutory 
jurisdiction of a Court of Chancery, especially as this sort of 
problem, in the borderland between tort and administrative law, 
must be remote of anything that the Chancery Commissioners or 
Parliament could have had in mind, in 1856 or 1858: compare 
Attorney General v Birkenhead Borough" p.9, and later 
"Whatever room there may be for damages in administrative law, 
it could not be right, in a case of this kind and on such 
restricted arugment, to let them in by the sidewind of a 
discretion under Lord Cairns' Act". 
Once it is acknowledged that Lord Cairns' Act will provide a remedy 
in circumstances where none is available at common law, it is 
submitted that although development in the law of torts had not 
reached the point where a new category of tort can yet be clearly 
perceived, if a Court has decided that it has jurisdiction to award 
an injunction in a case arising in the public law field, it must ipso 
facto have concluded that no adequate remedy exists at common law. 
As the remedies created by Lord Cairns' Act are designed to 
compensate a party in circumstances where the Court has declined in 
its discretion to order an injunction, it is submitted that there is 
no good reason why the administrative law field should be picked out 
by the Courts in New Zealand as the one department of law to which 
Lord Cairns' Act should have no application. It is submitted further 
that the discretionary remedy and the discretion associated with it 
(exercised in accordance with accepted principles) would be a useful 
means of developing the law relating to compensation in the 
administrative field. 
As a counterpoint to the dicta of Cook J. in Stininato, the 
complexity with which the common law appears to be developing in this 
field, expressed by the trenchant comments of Lord Wilberforce, may, 
5. 
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itself be a good reason why the evolution of damages in 
administrative law may not be brought about by the development of the 
law of tort, and why such evolution might well occur under Lord 
Cairns' Act. 
The one are of administrative action in which neither an injunction 
nor specific performance may be obtained is in respect of Acts of the 
Crown ( 11 Her Majesty in right of New Zealand") or of officers of the 
Crown where the relief would in effect be agaisnt the Crown. Section 
17 Crown Proceedings Act 1950. 
The rationale for such a provision has been that in times of 
emergency the Government may have to do unlawful acts infringing 
individual rights and it would be detrimental to the public if a 
grieved party were to be able to obtain the immediate intervention of 
the Court to prevent that. De Smith at p.445. Other common law 
jurisdictions, Australia for example, have not seen the need to 
prevent in this way interlocutory relief being obtained to restrain 
unlawful acts done by the Crown or its servants. As the Act must, it 
appears, be interpreted to deprive the Court of its jurisdiction to 
award the special remedies, equitable damages will also be 
unavailable against the Crown while the enactment continues in 
force. 
The Exercise of the Discretion to Grant Damages in Equity 
The first general proposition to be made about the exercise of this 
discretion is that when its jurisdiction to grant an injunction or 
specific performance has been established by reference: 
(a) in the case of an injunction to the breach of a common law right 
or "Independently of any question as to the right at law, ••. an 
injury, whether arising from a violation of an unquestionable 
right or from a breach of contract or confidence" in respect of 
which the Court of Chancery had an original independent 
jurisdiction (4 Halsbury 24 para 916) or 
(b) in the case of specific performance, to a breach of contract 
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where there was no adequate remedy at law, and where the other 
elements giving the Court jurisdiction are present, then the Court 
will generally grant an injunction or specific performance. Sefton v 
Tophams Ltd (1965) Ch 1140 at 1169. 
The second general proposition is that having refused to exercise its 
discretion to grant an injunction once jurisdiction has been 
established, it does not follow that the equitable damages will 
necessarily be granted - all equitable relief of whatever kind be 
refused. Spry, Equitable Remedies (1981) 556. 
The third general proposition about the exercise of the discretion to 
award damages is that the very existence of a power to award 
equitable damages will affect the Court's decision whether or not to 
grant special relief. Where the Court has a choice it may not grant 
the relief it would have done had the power to award damages not been 
available. However the Court will only substitute damages where the 
hardship to the defendant in ordering specific enforcement outweighs 
the inconvenience to the plaintiff if damages only are awarded. In 
other words, would it be highly unreasonable to make an order "in 
specie" when damages would be sufficient. Norton v Angus (1926) 38 
CLR 523 at 529. It should be borne in mind here that an award of 
damages may be the course preferred by a defendant as it enables him 
to carry on an activity, or to retain property, profitably perhaps, 
for the payment of a sum of money, which would otherwise be denied to 
him altogether. 
Equitable technique forbids the laying down of rigid rules for the 
exercise of the discretion, and this is particularly so in the case 
of damages in equity which depends on the exercise of a discretion 
whether or not to award damages) upon a discretion (whether or not to 
order an injunction/specific performance). However a series of 
fairly rigidly expressed rules as to when equitable damages might be 
awarded were spelt out in Shelfer v City of London Electric Lighting 
Co Ltd (1895) 1 Ch 287 at 322 - 323, as follows: 
1. Injury to the plaintiff's rights is small; 
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2. it can be estimated in money; 
3. it can be compensated by a small money payment; 
4. it would be oppressive to the defendant to grant specific 
re 1 i ef. 
The Judge gave his reasons for restricting the exercise of the 
discretion thus: 11 A person in committing a wrongful act (whether it 
be a public company for public purposes or a private individual) is 
not thereby entitled to ask the Court to sanction his doing so by 
purchasing his neighbour's rights, by assessing damages in that 
behalf, leaving his neighbour with the nuisance, or his lights 
dimmed, as the case may be. In such cases the well-known rule is not 
to accede to the application, but to grant the injunction sought". 
That Shelfer's case should not be treated as fettering, the 
discretion made available by Lord Cairns' Act was made clear in 
Fishenden v Higgs and Hill Ltd (1935) 152 L.T. 128, 141 by Romer LJ 
and in Cells v Home and Colonial Stores (1904) A.C. 179. The dangers 
of taking too narrow an approach to the discretion to award damages 
in Lord Cairns' Act are pointed out by Spry (supra) at p.558 and by 
Jolowicz in Damages in Equity - A Study of Lord Cairns' Act 1975 CLJ 
224 where the very restrictive approach to Lord Cairns' Act seemingly 
adopted by the House of Lords in Redland Bricks Ltd v Morris (1970) 
AC 652 when one Judge at least in the House of Lords regarded Lord 
Cairns' Act as having no application because the plaintiffs have not 
made out an adequate case for a mandatory injunction (to restore 
support to a neighbouring property), was described as being so 
extraordinary a proposition that it cannot have been the intention of 
the Judge to make it (but see Pettit, 1977 CLJ 369 infra). The Court 
of Appeal in Hooper v Rogers (1971) Ch 43 did not consider itself so 
restricted in the exercise of its discretion under the Act, and 
readily awarded damages in lieu of a mandatory injunction quia timet 
which in the exerise of its discretion it elect not to make. In 
Hooper v Rogers damages were awarded instead to enable an excavated 
slope to be restored to prevent potential damage. 
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Specific examples of the exercise of the discretion are summarised 
below, remembering that there are no rigid rules about the 
application of this discretion. 
(a) Extent of Loss 
In Ryder v Hall (supra) the Court was not prepared to make a 
mandatory injunction requiring the defendant, Canute like to 
roll back flood waters reposing on the plaintiff's land as a 
result of the defendant's action without causing loss or damage 
to the plaintiff, but the Court awarded nominal damages of 40 
shillings for the express purpose of preventing the plaintiff 
from coming back to Court (there had already been two trials 
with special juries). In Carpet Import Co v Beath (1972) NZLR 
37 a fire escape protruding over the plaintiff's land from some 
storeys up was regarded as a suitable object for the award of 
damages, rather than a mandatory injunction. In Ellis v 
Rasmussen (1911) 30 NZLR 316 (CA) the flooding of the 
plaintiff's land by a dam which drove a water wheel upon which 
the defendant relied for his business was regarded as a fit 
subject for an award of damages rather than an injunction 
restoring the status quo ante. 
(b) Damages Insufficient 
Where prospective loss is concerned, the Courts may decline to 
award damages because of the difficulty of assessing the loss. 
Such an award may simply prejudice a plaintiff by preventing him 
from making a claim in respect of the appropriate loss when it 
arises. Stellin v Hutt Speedways Ltd (1950) GLR 77, in which 
nuisances likely to arise every Saturday from the operation of 
the speedway could not in the view of O'Leary J. be compensated 
by a single payment of damages. 
(c) Conduct and Motive 
In AB Consolidated v Europe Strength Food (supra) the Court rejected 
the defendant's suggestion that damages would be an adequate remedy 
and awarded an injunction in part because the defendant was guilty of 
obvious and witting plagiarism. And in Dell v Beasley (1959) NZLR 
89, damages were awarded in lieu of specific performance in part 
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because of a misleading manner in which the plaintiff and her agents 
conducted the negotiations. Such considerations as fraud, 
misrepresentation, non-disclosure, unfairness, or want of clean hands 
on the part of the plaintiff may also have the result that both 
relief in specie and equitable damages are refused. 
(d) Laches and Acquiescence 
Similarly, these equitable considerations may lead the Court to 
refuse an injunction or specific performance, but to award equitable 
damages to a plaintiff, a full-back position for the dilatory. And 
where such considerations have led a defendant to change his 
position, all equitable relief, including damages under Lord Cairns' 
Act, may be refused. Malhotra v Chaudhury (1978) 3 WLR 825. 
(e) Hardship 
This factor has been considered in the general discussion of the 
exercise of the discretion, above. Most of the cases involve a 
balancing of the relative significance to the parties of the making 
of an injunction on the one hand and an award of damages on the 
other. In Dell v Beasley the excessive price asked of the defendant 
for the property was regarded as a factor which could be taken into 
account. See also Ellis v Rasmussen (supra). 
Measure of Equitable Damages 
In some cases (where there is jurisdiction to grant neither an 
injunction nor specific performance) damages at common law only may 
be claimed. In other cases, where there is no claim at common law, 
but where the claim is based solely on the invasion of rights or 
interests of an equitable character, damages will not be available at 
common law and may be claimed solely by virtue of Lord Cairns' Act, 
and thirdly, cases will arise where a plaintiff is entitled to 
damages either under Lord Cairns' Act or at common law, (where the 
breach of a common law right may be restrained by injunction or 
enforced by specific performance). 
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It will therefore be of interest to determine whether and the extent 
to which the measure of damages in equity differs from the principles 
which apply to the assessment of common law damages. 
Since Leeds Industrial Cooperative Society Ltd v Slack (supra) the 
approach towards the measure of damages under Lord Cairns' Act has 
evolved to the point (Lord Wilberforce in Johnson v Agnew (HL) (E)) 
(1980) AC 367) where the dilemma facing counsel as to whether to seek 
equitable damages or damages at common law where both might be 
available is now largely resolved. 
It will be recalled that Leeds Industrial Cooperative Society Ltd v 
Slack established that: 
"The power to give damages in lieu of an injunction must in all 
reason import the power to give an equivalent for what is lost 
by the refusal of an injunction" (or of specific performance). 
On the face of it, this test might well give rise to a very 
difference measure of damages than that at common law, which seeks 
11 restitutio in integrum 11 in respect of damage actually suffered as a 
result of the acts or breaches of the defendant, rather than as a 
result of the Court's refusal to grant a specific remedy. 
Thus in Grocott v Ayson (1975) 2 NZLR 59 the Court in that case was 
prepared to assess damages on the basis of the cost of reinstating a 
retaining wall to prevent future damage (c.f. Hooper v Rogers) after 
making various equitable adjustments. Such an award would clearly 
have been unavailable at common law and Cooke J. relied upon the 
decisions in Wroth v Tyler (1973) 1 All ER 897, Grant v Dawkins 
(1973) 1 All ER 897 and Souster v Epsom Plumbing Contractors Ltd 
(supra). He stated: 
"In those cases it has been held that, whatever may be the 
measure of damages at common law, under the Act damages in lieu 
of specific performance of a contract for the sale of land may 
be calculated on the value of the land at the date of 
assessment, rather than the date of the breach of contract; 
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such damages are to cover the area which would have been covered 
by an order for specific performance. Where, as here, damages 
are to be assessed in lieu of a quia timet injunction for 
apprehended harm, a somewhat similar idea may be invoked; but 
there is even less analogy with the common law, since no cause 
of action for that harm has yet accrued." 
Megarry J. in Wroth v Tyler noted that the normal measure of damages 
for breach of contract for sale of land was the difference between 
the contract price and the market price of the land at the date of 
the breach, normally the date of settlement. He noted that the 
common law rule may not be inflexible, but preferred to rely on Lord 
Cairn's Act which justified the assessment of damages on a basis not 
identical with that of the common law. (p.919) He cited the passage 
already quoted from the Leeds case (from the speech of Viscount 
Finlay), noting the refusal of the injunction or specific performance 
as the starting point for assessing damages in equity. He concluded 
that the Act entitled him to award damages by reference to a period 
subsequent to the date of breach on the basis that the plaintiffs 
were entitled to be put in the position they would have been in at 
the date of judgment, had the contract been performed. He noted (at 
p.922) that the second rule in Hadley v Baxenale did not exclude the 
possibility of damages at common law to cover the foreseeable effects 
of inflation. 
It was noted both in Wroth v Tyler, and in Souster v Epsom Plumbing 
Contractors Ltd (by McMullin J. at p.523) that the measure of damages 
at common law had tended to be limited to those suffered at the date 
of breach. The learned Judge cited a number of cases which appeared 
to award damages in respect of period subsequent to that date but in 
the end left open the question of whether the common law allowed a 
more flexible approach, and applied the principles in Lord Cairns' 
Act to assess damages based on the difference in value between the 
contract price and the date of judgment rather than settlement. 
Damages were similarly assessed in Malhotra v Choudhury (1979) 1 All 
ER 186 (CA) but the date for valuing the property was moved back a 
year. 
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In all these cases the question what was the true measure of damages 
at common law was left to one side, and the view was taken that 
whatever the answer, Lord Cairns' Act enabled the Court to fix 
damages on a different basis to that applying at common law. It will 
be noted that no attempt has been made at this point to distinguish 
between damages in lieu of specific performance, and damages in lieu 
of injunction, simply because the issue in both cases is whether the 
Court is entitled to measure damages differently in equity than it 
would do at common law. 
In Johnson v Agnew (supra) it could still be argued by Counsel that 
from the passing of Lord Cairns' Act in 1858 until Wroth v Tyler, 
there was no case in which damages had been assessed other than on a 
common law basis, and that although the Judge had material to assess 
damages at common law he thought he had jurisdiction to award another 
style of damages allowing something extra which the Act was never 
intended to confer. And the headnote states 11 that, although damages 
might be awarded under S.2 of the Chancery Amendment Act 1858 in some 
cases in which they could not be recovered at common law, the Act did 
not warrant the assessment of damages otherwise than on a common law 
basis". The headnote is incorrect. 
Lord Wilberforce at p.400 held: 
"Since the decision of this house, by majority, in Leeds 
Industrial Co-operative Society Ltd v Slack it is clear that the 
jurisdiction to award damages in accordance with S.2 of Lord 
Cairn's Act (accepted by the House as surviving the repeal of 
the Act) may arise in some cases in which damages could not be 
recovered at common law; (examples are given). To this extent 
the Act created a power to award damages which did not exist 
before at common law. But, apart from these and similar cases 
where damages could not be claimed at all at common law, there 
is a sound authority for the proposition that the Act does not 
provide for the assessment of damages on any new basis. The 
wording of S.2 11 may be assessed in such manner as the Court 
shall direct" does not so suggest, but clearly refers only to 
procedure". 
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The Judge concluded that if the test adopted by Wroth v Tyler (and 
the other cases above cited) established a different basis from that 
applicable at common law, then the cases were wrong. He cited 
Malhotra v Choudhury (supra) for the proposition that both equity and 
the common law would award damages on the same basis - in that case 
as on the date of judgment, and left open the question at what date 
damages for breach of contract for the sale of land however awarded 
ought to be assessed, and rather than tie the plaintiff to the date 
of the original breach, in this case assessed damages at the date 
when the contract was lost to the plaintiff. 
From Johnson v Agnew, a distinction may be drawn between cases where 
damages can only be obtained under Lord Cairns' Act and cases where 
there is a coextensive right at common law to damages. 
Where there is a coextensive right, damages under Lord Cairn's Act 
must be assessed on the same basis as damages at common law. On this 
footing, Lord Cairn's Act would only be of advantage by enabling 
damages to be awarded in the absence of any prayer for damages. 
In those cases where damages are not available at common law but 
where there is equitable jurisdiction to grant an injunction or 
order specific performance, then it is submitted that the measure 
outlined in Leeds Industrial Coop.Society Ltd v Slack based upon the 
loss suffered as a result of the refusal of the Court to grant the 
specific remedy (subject to such adjustment as equity requires) 
continues to be the proper measure. 
6. 
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Having concluded that the method of assessing damages in lieu of 
specific performance should be the same as that used at common law, 
Cook J. in Crofts & Anor v GUS Properites Ltd No A 602/75, 10 June 1981 
Christchurch Registry (unrep) observed, from Souster v Epsom 
Plumbing Ltd, Roth v Tyler, and Bousaid v Andry that damages for loss 
of a bargain should be assessed at the date when the contract is 
brought to an end by the action of the Court in refusing specific 
performance: this subject the observations of Quilliam J. in Hickey 
v Bruhns (1977) 2 NZLR 71 that where delay has been caused by a 
plaintiff the date of assessment should be adjusted. 
The extent to which Lord Cairns• Act is now interpreted as giving 
rise to a remedy in damages not available at common law, for which 
principles based solely on the Act must be developed, one might 
question the appropriateness of regarding the wording of S.2 to which 
Lord Wilberforce referred as procedural only, and therefore as 
diminishing the Court's discretion in the measure of damages. 
Specific Performance Rescission and Damages 
Common law damages are available as of right on a breach of contract 
for the sale of land. Equitable damages may be awarded as a matter 
of discretion following the refusal of a decree of specific 
performance. Because common law damages cannot be recovered unless 
claimed, and equitable damages are discretionary, damages should be 
expressly claimed in the pleadings. Specific performance and common 
law damages may be claimed in the alternative but an election of 
remedy must be made at the trial. Johnson v Agnew at p.392. 
The decision in Johnson v Agnew finally decided whether or not there 
was a right to damages after a decree of specific performance proved 
fruitless. A number of propositions were stated by Lord Wilberforce 
in the course of the judgment. 
Where a vendor has already accepted the repudiation of a contract by 
the other party, both are discharged from further performance, but 
the right to common law damages remains - the contract is not 
rescinded ab initio and can be sued upon. 
7. 
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If the order for specific performance is made, the contract survives 
and the enforcing party cannot treat it as being at an end except by 
obtaining a fresh order to that effect. 
Dealing with the issue before him, the Judge noted that there was 
some authority (Henty v Schroder) 12 Ch D 666 to Capital & Suburban 
Properties Ltd v Swycher (1976) Ch 319) to the effect that damages 
could not be obtained once the Court had made an order putting an end 
to the contract so releasing the plaintiff from his obligations 
(presumably on the basis that the contract was then a nullity ab 
initio). See Oakley - Damages in Lieu of a Decree for Specific 
Performance (1978) CLJ 41. 
Lord Wilberforce concluded that both on rescission/acceptance of 
repudiation and upon cancellation of the contract following an 
aborted order for specific performance, the Court could award damages 
- under Lord Cairns• Act, because having invoked the equitable 
jurisdiction in making the decree of specific performance, control of 
the matter had subsequently to be exercised according to equitable 
principles (at p.399). As has been seen, the Judge concluded that 
the basis for the assessment of damages was the same in equity and at 
common law for the purposes of this case. 
Equitable Damages in the District Court 
By S. 34 of the District Courts Act 1947 the District Court has 
jurisdiction to hear and determine proceedings for specific 
performance where the value of the property does not exceed $12,000 
(S.34 (l)(b)), and by S.41 may (within these limits) give any remedy 
which a Judge of the High Court could give. The District Court 
therefore has jurisdiction to award damages in lieu of specific 
performance under Lord Cairns' Act. 
The District Court has power under the ancilliary jurisdiction in 
S.41 to order an injunction in the context of an action where a 
substantial part of the claim (whether small or large) is a money 
claim within the jurisdiction of the Court. 
If the Court can grant an injunction, it may award equitable damages 
in lieu or in addition. 
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Care must be taken however where a quia timet injunction is being 
claimed. In analysing Hooper v Rodgers and Redland Brick Ltd v 
Morris, it has been argued, Pettit in Lord Cairns' Act in the 
County Court: a Supplementary Note 1977 CLJ p.309, that either 
(a) where a quia timet injunction is sought, it cannot be ancilliary 
to a claim for damages as is required in the District Court 
because by definition damage has not yet been suffered and 
cannot therefore be claimed at common law independently of a 
claim under Lord Cairns' Act which can only be invoked if the 
Court has jurisdiction to grant the injunction in the first 
place; or 
(b) if in those cases there was jurisdiction to grant an injunction 
(as asserted by Jolowicz in the CLJ article already referred 
to),then the Court had jurisdiction to award equitable damages 
in satisfaction of past and future loss arising out of the facts 
alleged, and the fact that equitable damages had not been 
claimed in the Redland Brick case should not have been used by 
the Court as a reason for declining this relief. Jurisdiction 
to award equitable damages would be limited to $12,000. 
It is suggested that if some loss has actually occurred for which 
damages are claimed, then the District Court will have jurisdiction 
to grant a quia timet injunction (or damages in lieu) in respect of 
future loss, but if all that is sought is an injunction in respect of 
future loss, then the injunction is sought as a sole rather than as 
an ancillary remedy and the District Court will not have jurisdiction 
to entertain the application (or, by extension) to award damages 
under Lord Cairns' Act. 
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